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from obvious that the biological explanations treat facts about matter as 
primitive. I offered the following three considerations. 
First, from Aristotle's discussions in PA II.I, it would seem that matter at 
the lowest level of composition - an organism's bodily blend or krasis - is 
not primitive, at least not if one accepts that citing what something is for 
the sake of entails that it is explained. Second, there is reason to think that 
certain appeals to krasis are not intended as references to primitive facts. 
For Aristotle correlates facts about a kind's krasis with facts about human 
rationality. If human rational capacities are part of human essence, this 
would render the coordination between essence and matter a coincidence. 
But I do not think that this can be Aristotle's view. Third and finally, 
I have tried to indicate the way in which Aristotle's conception of the 
metabolic processes - the heating and cooling involved in reproduction, 
development, and maintenance - imbeds the actions of the elemental 
powers into the activity of the soul or form of the organism. Heat and 
cold are tools by which soul activities are carried out. This bars them from 
being "independently" operative in the way that has been suggested in the 
recent literature. 
CHAPTER 4 
Blood, matter, and necessiry 
DavidEbrey 
According to most scholars, in the Parts of Animals Aristotle frequently 
provides explanations in terms of material necessity, as well as explanations 
in terms of that for the sake of which, that is, final causes.1 This material 
necessity is not supposed to be the necessity-from a hypothesis that Aristotle 
describes in Physics n.8, which involves the necessity of matter given some 
end, but rather a type of necessity that results directly from matter, for 
example, the necessity of fire to heat. Aristotle says in the first chapter of 
the Parts of Animals that he is looking for two causes, the "of necessity" and 
the "that for the sake of which" (642ar-3), and he follows through on this 
in the rest of the Parts of Animals, frequently bringing his explanations back 
to these two causes. But he never uses the phrase "material necessity." It is a 
substantive interpretation that matter is connected to necessity in this way. 
In this chapter, I argue that we misunderstand both matter and the way 
that Aristotle explains things using necessity if we interpret Aristotle as 
explaining things in terms of material necessity. 2 In the first half of the 
chapter, I provide an account of how Aristotle uses the term "matter" in 
the Parts of Animals. He does not use it very frequently in his detailed 
discussions of animal parts; when he does use it, he typically identifies 
blood as matter. The reason for this, I argue, is the following. Blood is, for 
Aristotle, what properly nourishes and grows the other parts of the body 
and he views nourishment and growth as types of coming to be. Matter, for 
Aristotle, is what comes-to-be other things and hence what nourishes and 
I have received valuable feedback from Devin Henry; Northwestern's Junior Faculty Working group, 
UW-Milwaultee, The Greeks at UW-Madison, the conference "Theory and Practice in Aristotle's 
Natural Philosophy'' at Northwestern, and at the "New Directions" workshop at Rutgers. 
1 Lennox i987, Gill 1997, Henry 2007, and Leunissen 2010 (passim). This is separate from the view 
Gelber discusses in this volume that there are primitive facts about matter. However, these views 
are typically found together and naturally complement one another: there are primitive facts about 
matter and these are necessary facts. 
2 Lennox's (1987), Henry's (2007), and Leunissen's (2010) projects are not primarily focused on matter 
or necessity. So, even ifI am right, this need not cause major problems for their overall projects. 
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grows the parts of the body will be a type of matter. Blood, for Aristotle, 
can nourish or grow different animal parts and so, rather than necessitating 
a particular outcome, it is open to very different results. 
The second half of the chapter turns to necessity as a cause in the Parts 
of Animals. How should we understand this, if we do not think of it as 
having a special connection to matter? I argue that sometimes this necessity 
is the result of agent and patient coming together. But in other cases the 
necessity follows from a thing's essence or is a sort of conceptual truth. 
Aristotle does not distinguish between these different sorts of necessity in 
the Parts of Animals. In fact, he shows no interest in analyzing the types of 
necessity involved in his detailed biological explanations. Instead, he views 
his task as complete once he has brought a question back to a necessity as 
a cause (perhaps along with a final cause). The term "material necessity" 
obscures the unusual sort of cause he is giving in the Parts of Animals: 
undifferentiated necessity. 
Blood and matter in the Parts of Animals 
It is important not to allow our ordinary ideas about matter to influence 
how we understand matter in Aristotle. The term we translate as "matter," 
hule, originally meant trees, wood, or lumber. The only extant use before 
Aristotle to mean something roughly like matter is a single occurrence 
in Plato's Philebus (54c). Aristotle certainly developed his notion of hule 
using related ideas from his predecessors, and perhaps other people were 
developing ideas about hule in the Academy. Nonetheless, Aristotle was at 
the forefront of developing a new concept, one that he says in Metaphysics A 
was not properly grasped by any of his predecessors (985a9-17 and 993an-
17). It is not clear how close our current ideas about matter are to the one 
that Aristotle thought was crucial for understanding the natural world. 
Given this, it is useful to work our way up from the passages where 
Aristotle uses the term hule. Aristotle only uses the word 30 times in the 
Parts of Animals; 15 of them are in the first, theoretical, book; 5 of them 
are in the first page of book n, chapter 1, leaving only IO occurrences in 
the rest of books n-IV, where Aristotle provides his detailed discussion of 
animal parts.3 This is compared to 68 occurrences in the Generation of 
Animals. Moreover, in 7 of the last IO occurrences, the matter in question 
is identified as blood. 
3 Based on searches in the TLG. 
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Why does Aristotle generally identify blood as matter in his detailed 
discussion of animal parts? While there are complications, the basic reason 
is this: matter, for Aristotle, is intimately tied with change. In particular, 
the matter for some change is what properly speaking undergoes that 
change. I argue elsewhere that this is the correct interpretation of matter in 
Aristotle's Physics book r.4 ln brief, Aristotle motivates the need for matter in 
Physics r by arguing that in every change there must be something that 
properly undergoes the change. This is why he says in Phys. r. 7 that things 
come to be from matter not by virtue of concurrence (19ob24-27). In this 
chapter I simply argue that what we find in the Parts of Animals fits with this 
view. Blood, according to Aristotle, is produced by the body precisely to 
be something that can come-to-be each of the internal organs and uniform 
parts. Matter plays a more prominent role in the Generation of Animals 
because generation is central to that work. 
Blood is the first part that Aristotle discusses in the Parts of Animals.5 
He begins his discussion of blood in PA n.2, but says that to discuss it he 
first must discuss heat and the opposites dry and moist, since blood is hot 
and moist. He concludes this preliminary discussion, in rr.3, with the claim 
that blood is the final nourishment in blooded animals (bloodless animals, 
he thinks, have an analogue to blood). There is the nourishment that we 
take into our bodies as food. But this must be concocted, with heat, in the 
stomach, until it is in the form of this final nourishment. Blood, he says, is 
for the sake of nourishing. Blood's moisture and heat are not independent 
features of it; it nourishes because it is moist and hot. 6 
Aristotle thinks that some of an organism's differing characteristics are 
explained by different types of blood: some animals have a subtle intelli-
gence because of thin and pure blood; timid animals have watery blood; 
those with fibrous thick blood are more spirited (648a2-n; 65obr9-651a5). 
Near the end of discussing this feature of blood he connects it to matter: 
The nature of the blood is the cause of many features of animals with respect 
to both character and perception, as is reasonable, since blood is the matter 
of the entire body; for nourishment is matter and blood is the last stage of 
nourishment. (651ar2-15)7 
4 See Ebrey 2007 and Ebrey (unpublished) "Distinguishing Matter from Lack in Physics r." See also 
Alan Code's contribution in this volume, which discusses Aristotle's view of matter in Metaphysics H 
and is complementary to my own. 
5 Chris Frey (forthcoming), "From Blood to Flesh: Homonymy; Uniry; and Ways ofBeing in Aristotle," 
Ancient Philosophy, section r, argues that Aristotle's considered view is that blood is not a part. For 
my purposes, it does not matter whether it is a proper part or merely a part-like thing. 
6 For a short, complementary discussion of blood in Aristotle, see Freeland 1987, p. 401. 
7 Translations from Lennox 2001a, occasionally lightly revised. 
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Aristotle says that blood is the matter for the entire body because it is 
nourishment for the body. In order to explain why blood's being nour-
ishment qualifies it as matter, we need to understand Aristotle's theory of 
nourishment. In the Parts of Animals he refers us to discussions of nourish-
ment (65obro, 668a8-9). This may refer, in part, to a lost treatise; however, 
there is a discussion in Generation and Corruption's chapter on growth 
(r.5) and a more extensive discussion of nourishment throughout book II 
of Generation of Animals (especially II.4, n.6, and II.7).8 Nourishment is 
treated as fundamentally similar to growth (e.g., GC 1.5, 322a23-28). In 
both cases, the body takes something into it. Normally, if something enters 
a body, it is simply a foreign body. But in growth or nourishment, the 
thing that is brought in becomes part of the new thing. Thus, growth 
and nourishment are both types of coming to be. The difference is that 
in growth there is a change of size, whereas in nourishment the thing 
does not change in size (typically, one imagines, because waste is also 
produced). 
Blood is concocted to be the body's nourishment. But, in fact, it is 
more than that. The organs themselves come to be from blood, as we can 
see in the following passage from PA ni.5, Aristotle's chapter on blood 
vessels: 
A cause of the blood vessels being distributed over the entire body is that the 
blood and its analogue in bloodless animals are matter for the entire body, 
while these are stored in blood vessel and its analogue. As to how and from 
what animals are nourished, and in what manner they absorb nourishment 
from the gut, it is more appropriate to investigate and speak about such 
things in the works on generation. And since the parts are constituted 
from the blood, as we said, it is reasonable that the course of the blood 
vessels runs naturally through the entire body; for the blood too needs to be 
passing through everything and next to everything, if each of the parts is to 
be constituted from it. (668ar-n) 
At the beginning of the passage we see that the fact that blood is matter 
for the entire body explains why we have blood vessels throughout our 
entire body. And at the end of the passage we are told that each of the 
parts is constituted by blood.9 Thus, blood constitutes, nourishes, and 
grows the parts of the body. In GA IV.I Aristotle ties this to a more general 
principle: 
8 For a discussion, see Lennox 2001a, pp. 200-i. 
9 Note that Aristotle thinks that different types of blood are involved in different types of change. 
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Since it is the same, that out of which something comes to be and grows, 
namely the nourishment, each of the parts comes to be out of that sort of 
matter and that sort of residue which it is fitted to receive. (766aro-13) 
Note, then, that blood is quite open to possibility for Aristotle - blood can 
come to be, nourish or grow a number of different parts; on its own, blood 
does not necessitate any particular action. 
We have seen that in the detailed discussion of parts in the Parts of 
Animals Aristotle typically identifies matter as blood. This is what the 
body concocts to properly nourish and grow the uniform parts. In general, 
things properly come to be from matter and Aristotle thinks that the 
body only concocts one thing to play that role: blood. However, there 
are a few cases in the detailed discussion in the Parts of Animals where 
something other than blood is identified as matter. There is the case of 
birds lacking ear-matter considered in the next section of this chapter. 
For now, let us consider passages from the beginning of book II that 
suggest a progressively broader scope for matter. Near the beginning of 
Aristotle's discussion of blood he suggests a somewhat broader scope for 
matter: 
First of all, then, many modes of cause may be attributed to the moist parts 
and the dry. Some of them serve as matter for the non-uniform parts (since 
each of the instrumental parts has been constituted from these, i.e., from 
bones, sinews, flesh, and other such parts, some contributing to the ousia 
[substance, being) of the instrumental parts, some to their operation); some 
of the moist parts are nourishment for the non-uniform parts (for all derive 
their growth from what is moist); and some of them turn out to be residues, 
such as the sediment from dry nourishment and, in those with a bladder, 
from moist. (647b20-29) 
Bones, sinew, flesh, and other parts are described as matter, and put along-
side the moist parts that are nourishment. Since blood is a moist parr-"that 
is nourishment, this might even suggest that blood is not matter, although 
Aristotle does not actually say this (and it contradicts what he says later 
in the chapter).10 Aristotle's account seems to be the following: blood is 
the matter for the uniform parts and nourishes all parts, whereas the other 
uniform parts (such as bones, etc.) are, in turn, matter for arms, legs, etc. 
When blood nourishes the arm, it does so by nourishing the uniform parts, 
such as flesh, that constitute the arm. 
ro At the beginning of GA 1.1 all parts are described as matter. 
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This leaves us with a question: If bones and sinews are matter for the 
non-uniform parts, why does Aristotle not mention this in his discussion 
of bones and sinews? Why is blood repeatedly referred to as matter in 
the Parts of Animals, and not these uniform parts, if they are also matter? 
The reason is that there is something special about blood: its nature is to 
come to be something else. The other parts are not as intimately tied to 
coming to be as blood. While these parts do play a role in the coming 
to be of the whole organism, their primary function is not to play this role. 
Their primary function is determined by their function in a fully formed 
organism. One can provide an account of bone without mentioning that it 
is matter, in a way that one cannot do with blood. The primary function of 
blood is to generate, maintain, and grow the parts, and these are all types 
of coming to be. For blood to be fully developed is for it to be primed to 
come to be something else, unlike with the other parts. 
On this account, something is matter to the extent that it is playing a 
certain role.n When Aristotle is describing something, but not as part of 
this role, he is not describing it insofar as it is matter. Aristotle would not 
tack onto his description of the liver that it is matter for the organism. This 
is not relevant to the sort of part-by-part description he gives in the Parts 
of Animals. But when Aristotle asks whether he has discussed the matter 
of the organism (as he does at the beginning of GA LI), he can say that he 
has. This is one important reason for us not to systematically redescribe 
Aristotle's biological works using the term "matter" in places where he does 
not use this term. Aristotle almost always uses the term when it is relevant 
to the discussion that the thing is functioning as matter. When you describe 
something as matter out of context you can mistakenly ascribe features to 
it that do not hold insofar as it is matter. 
There is a question remaining for this account: Does calling the (non-
uniform) parts matter undermine the idea that matter is what something 
properly speaking comes to be from? After all, it is not dear that wholes 
come to be from their parts. This, in short, is Ackrill's classic puzzle about 
matter.12 
Aristotle's view in the Parts of Animals is that things do, in fact, come 
to be from their parts. The generation of animals involves the successive 
generation of their parts until the whole organism is formed. Thus, here 
too matter is what a thing comes to be from. We can see that Aristotle is 
committed to such a view at the beginning of PA II.I. Let us examine this 
passage both (1) to finish our discussion of parts as matter, and (2) to turn 
u For a similar account, see Code's chapter in this volume, section 2. 12 Ackrill 1972/n 
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to a new topic, the idea that matter is for the sake of what it becomes. Here 
is the passage: 
In generation things are opposed to the way they are in being (Tf\S ov<Jio:s); 
for things posterior in generation are prior in nature, and the final stage in 
generation is primary in nature. For instance, a house is not for the sake 
of bricks and stones, but rather these are for the sal{e of the house - and 
so it is with other matter. Not only is it apparent from a consideration of 
cases that this is the way things are, but it also accords with our account; 
for every generated thing develops from something and into something, 
i.e., from an origin to an origin, from the primary mover which already has 
a certain nature to a certain shape or other such end. For a human being 
generates a human being, and a plant a plant, from the underlying matter 
of each. So the matter and the generation are necessarily prior in time, 
but in account the being and the shape of each thing. This would be clear 
if someone were to state the account of the generation of something; the 
account of housebuilding includes that of the house, while that of the house 
does not include that of housebuilding. And so it is in the other cases as well. 
Thus the matter of the elements is necessary for the sake of the uniform 
parts, since these are later in generation than the elements, and later than 
the uniform are the non-uniform; for these have already attained their end 
and limit, having achieved a constitution of the third sort, as often happens 
when generations are completed. 
Thus animals have been constituted from both of these parts, but the 
uniform parts are for the sake of the non-uniform ... (646a24-b12) 
As one would expect from the account of matter I provided above, Aristotle 
identifies matter as what things come to be from. He then infers from this 
that matter is prior in time to what it constitutes. One might wonder 
whether flesh really does develop prior in time to the parts constituted by 
flesh. But Aristotle's position in this passage is that it does. Given that he 
thinks of matter as what things come to be from, we can see why he would 
naturally think that it is prior in time to what it constitutes. 
So far in this section we have seen no connection between matter and 
necessity in the Parts of Animals. The claim that matter is for the sake of 
something provides a further reason to be wary of reading a connection 
between matter and necessity. In some places, notably GA v, Aristotle 
claims that things can be necessary without being for the sake of anything. 
These are sometimes taken to be clear cases of material necessity. 13 But then, 
given what we have seen above, to precisely that extent they should not 
be due to matter, because matter is for the sal{e of something. One might 
want to say that iron is matter for the saw, but it is not for the sake of the 
IJ For example, Leunissen 2oro, p. 141. 
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saw. However, this is not Aristotle's view; in describing it as matter, we are 
describing it as for the sake of the saw. Aristotle says in the above passage 
that the bricks and stones are for the sake of the house, and so it is with 
other matter. Blood, in particular, is said to be for the sake of nourishment 
and growth. Thus, we should not think of any and all things explained 
non-teleologically as explained materially. On the contrary, Aristotle thinks 
that matter is teleological. 
To summarize, on the few occasions when Aristotle mentions matter in 
providing his detailed accounts of animal parts, it is mostly identified as 
blood, because it is from this that the parts of animals nourish and grow. 
While other parts can be described as matter, this is not central to their 
function as a part. Matter is prior in time to what it becomes and for the 
sake of this thing. 
Necessity 
As mentioned earlier, in PA I.I Aristotle says that we should look for two 
causes: the from-necessity and that for the sake of which ( 642ar-2). He goes 
on to do just this throughout the Parts of Animals and the Generation of 
Animals. The examples are ubiquitous.14 In addition to identifying necessity 
as a cause, he uses it along with causal language, such as the use of dia 
with the accusative (because of). Cause (cxhicx) and related words show up 
164 times in the Parts of Animals. Scholars often note that it is not dear how 
closely related Parts of Animals book I is to books n-1v.15 This is one way 
in which the distinctive promises of book I are carried out in books II-N. 
Someone who just read the Physics, say, or Generation and Corruption book 
1, would not be prepared for the focus in PA II-IV on "from necessity" and 
"that for the sake of which" as causes. 16 
This idea of "from necessity" as a cause seems rather strange. We know 
that Aristotle in many places, including the Physics, Metaphysics, and the 
beginning of Generation of Animals, says that there are four causes. And in 
a number of passages he suggests that that for the sake of which is the same 
as the form and the efficient cause. So this creates natural pressure toward 
thinking that "necessity" is a stand-in, of some sort, for matter. This seems 
14 The noun &vc'xyKTJ and the adjective &vayKaiov show up 172 times in the Parts of Animals. Of 
course, not all of these uses are related to necessity as a cause. 
1~ For example, Lennox 2001a. But Lennox 2010 argues for tighter connection. 
16 Contrast Leunissen 2010, section 4.3, where she treats Aristotle as giving formal and material causes 
tlrroughout the Parts of Animals (on pp. 146-47 she identifies these as the primary causes). On 
my reading, Aristotle identifies the causes as from necessity and that for the sake of which; he 
occasionally mentions matter, but he is typically not giving matter as a cause of the feature to be 
explained. 
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to be one of the basic reasons that it is associated with matter.17 There are 
other reasons as well, some of which will be touched on below. 
My focus will be on providing a positive account of how Aristotle uses 
from-necessity as a cause. Phys. II.9 leads one to expect that the necessity 
in the Parts of Animals is a type of hypothetical necessity, where something 
is necessary given the hypothesis that some end is achieved. In fact, in 
a couple of places in PA I.I Aristotle suggests this same picture (639b21-
64oa9, 642ar-13). But, as is frequently pointed out, in most cases it is not 
this sort of hypothetical necessity that is identified as a cause in Parts of 
Animals II-N. Instead, he treats certain features of animal parts as due to a 
more direct form of necessity. The last paragraph of PA I.I is the only place 
in the Parts of Animals where he seems to provide a general description of 
this other sort of necessity.18 
One should explain in the following way, e.g., breathing exists for the sake of 
this, while that comes to be from necessity because of these. But "necessity" 
sometimes signifies that if that - i.e., that for the sake of which - is to be, it 
is necessary for these things to obtain, while at other times it signifies that 
things are thus in respect of things possessed and naturally produced. For it is 
necessary for the hot to go out and enter again upon meeting resistance, and 
for the air to flow in. This is directly necessary; and it is as the internal heat 
retreats during the cooling of the external air that inhalation and exhalation 
occur. This then is the way of investigation, and it is in relation to these 
things and things such as these that one should grasp the causes. (642a3r-b4) 
Notice that we are told that this non-hypothetical sort of necessity comes 
from things "possessed and naturally produced." Assuming that this is 
what Aristotle pursues in the Parts of Animals books II-N, we are left with 
the question of how and why "things possessed and naturally produced" 
(exov-rcx Kcxi TIE<pvKoTcx) necessitate. In particular, is this necessity directly 
connected to matter? 
In PA I.I, Aristotle treats from-necessity explanations as something every-
one agrees to, so he only seems to think that he needs to argue for the final 
cause. However, it is not dear that he accepts necessity as a cause for the 
same reason that Democritus or other Presocratics did. Thus, in order to 
17 Monte Johnson in his discussion of Po. An. II.II (Johnson 2005, Chapter 2, section 3) and of 
Aristotle's biology (Johnson 2005, Chapter 6, sections 4 and 5) suggests that matter could be a 
specific case of the from-necessity cause (Johnson 2005). This is a complicated issue that I cannot 
adequately address here. My own view is that Aristotle may treat from-necessity and matter as 
different species of that-out-of-which, but matter is not a species of from-necessity, since it does 
not necessitate. This depends on some tricky issues in Aristotle's difficult Po. An. II.Ir. 
18 Although, as Scharle points out in her contribution to this volume, at 64oa23-b4 Aristotle suggests 
an important role for non-hypothetical, non-teleological necessity. Her account and discussion 
complement my own here. 
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understand how he thinks of necessity as a cause, it is useful to look at 
some of the actual explanations he gives in books II-IV. Necessity operates 
as a cause in a number of different ways in the Parts of Animals, so we will 
consider a number of passages to get an overview. Here is a simple case 
where both necessity and a final cause are cited and causal language is used, 
but in this case (unlike many others), the word "cause" is not used: 
With respect to the head, mankind is the most hairy of animals, from 
necessity, because of (81a) the moistness of the brain and because of (81a) 
the sutures (for where there is much moisture and heat there must be much 
growth), and for the sake of protection, so that it may provide covering, 
warding off the extremes of both cold and heat. And since the human brain 
is the most moist, it is also most in need of this protection; for what is moist 
boils and freezes most easily, while what is in the opposite state is less easily 
affected. (658b2-10) 
The first question to ask about this sort of passage is why Aristotle thinks 
that it involves a type of necessity. The things described as necessary in 
the Parts of Animals are generally not strictly necessary, in the sense of 
impossible to be otherwise. To use the above example, it is not the case that 
human heads absolutely must be hairy. In Aristotle's language, this happens 
for the most part. There could be some sort of blockage in the sutures that 
does not allow the hair to grow. Moreover, as we know, Aristotle insists 
that there is no unqualified necessity in the sublunary realm. 
These sorts of considerations lead Jacob Rosen to suggest that "necessity" 
in the Parts of Animals means something like compulsion or force - the sort 
of meaning it seems to have in Plato's Timaeus. 19 However, Lennox points 
out that this meaning of necessity as compulsion is treated as a special case 
in Posterior Analytics II.II, where Aristotle discusses necessity as a cause. 20 
But Rosen is right to search for an explanation of why Aristotle thinks of 
these as cases of necessity. A different solution is suggested by Generation 
of Animals. There the idea is that something results of necessity when the 
agent and patient, identified as efficient cause and matter, come together. 
This is likely a shortened version of Aristotle's idea that when agent and 
patient come together, so long as nothing interferes, the result comes 
about of necessity. We find this idea, for example, in Metaphysics Theta 
5 and Phys. VIII.4. 21 Perhaps when we discuss biology, we are discussing 
'9 Rosen 2008, pp. n2-13. 20 Lennox 2oora, p. 149· 
21 This is not explicitly listed as a separate type of necessity in Metaphysics 11 5, Aristotle's chapter 
on necessity. Perhaps it falls under the broader type of necessity that involves not being able to be 
otherwise. The focus in GC II.II is on tlre guaranteed necessity of generation - a rather different 
topic. 
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how things normally are, in which case nothing is preventing. There are 
at least three passages in the Generation of Animals that suggest necessity 
resulting from this (73rb18-23, 74ob21-25, 778a34-b5). Although all three 
contribute something different, it is sufficient to consider one. One passage 
is in GA 1i.4; it is Aristotle's second explanation of why the uniform parts 
are formed: 
When the active thing and the passive thing, when they are in contact, are 
in the way that the one is acting and the other is being a patient (by "way" 
I mean the manner, the place, and the time), then immediately (evlhls) the 
one acts and the other is passive. In this case, it is the female that provides the 
matter, and the male that provides the principle of movement. (74ob21-25) 
Aristotle's point is that in general when agent and patient come together 
in the right way, they straight away act; thus, this is how things will work 
in this particular case, where the mother provides the matter (and hence 
the patient) and the father the efficient cause (and hence the agent). In this 
passage Aristotle does not explicitly mention necessity, although he does 
in the other two passages (731b18-23 and 778a34-b5). 
Aristotle's general principle, in Metaphysics Theta and Physics VIII, is put 
in terms of agent and patient. He often uses these terms interchangeably 
with moving cause (i.e., the efficient cause) and matter, although he is 
more likely to use the terms "moving cause" and "matter" when discussing 
generation and more likely to use the terms "agent" and "patient" when 
discussing alteration and locomotion.22 Nonetheless, he does talk about 
the matter for alteration, locomotion, and growth and he does talk about 
the agent and patient in generation (as we saw in the previous passage). 
There is a type of matter that is relevant to this sort of necessity. It is 
nonetheless misleading to call it material necessity because that suggests 
that matter plays a primary role in explaining these changes and results. 
Instead, the efficient cause is at least as responsible as the matter. Matter, 
taken on its own, is typically open to different possibilities. Blood can 
become different organs, or sustain them. It is only when blood is acted on 
in the right way that it becomes something specific. Moreover, it is worth 
understanding how Aristotle uses his own explanatory concepts. He almost 
never uses matter in his detailed explanations of animal parts. Rather, his 
goal - and what he does - is to trace things back to necessity as a cause. 
He is not trying to identify matter as a cause. 
22 See Code's contribution to this volume, section 2, for an argument that for Aristotle matter only 
strictly applies in cases of generation and corruption simpliciter. 
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The following is an example in the Parts of Animals of a from-necessity 
cause that fits this matter/efficient-cause model: 
The kidneys have the most fat of all the viscera. On the one hand, this is 
out of necessity, because the residue is filtered through the kidneys. For the 
remaining blood, being pure, is capable of good concoction; and soft and 
hard fat is an end of well-concocted blood. For just as in dry things that have 
been burnt, such as ash, some fire is left behind in them, so it is in moist 
things that have undergone concoction as well; that is, some portion of the 
heat which was operative is left behind in them. This is why what is oily is 
light and rises to the surface in liquids. Hence, on account of the visceral 
body being dense, the fat does not come to be in the kidneys themselves, 
but surrounds them on the outside, soft in the ones with soft fat, hard in 
the ones with hard fat. (The differences between these two sorts of fat have 
been stated previously elsewhere.) So on the one hand it is of necessity- this 
is the cause owing to which the kidneys come to be fatty, a consequence of 
what happens of necessity in animals with kidneys; on the other hand, they 
also come to be fatty for the sake of preservation of the kidneys and of their 
natural heat. (672ar-r5) 
Blood is matter for fat. Excess heat acts on the blood and turns it into fat; 
this process, of blood being heated, is how fat is normally formed (PA II. 5). 
Although Aristotle does not do so, we could apply his concepts and say 
that the heat acts as an efficient cause on the blood, which is the matter. 
This happens of necessity, given the location of heat and blood. But it also 
is for the salze of preservation. 
Not all cases of necessity fall under this matter/efficient-cause rubric. 
One example is important; it is the only case in the Parts of Animals 
where Aristotle explicitly mentions matter when giving an of-necessity 
explanation. 
The birds possess only auditory channels [rather than ears], on account of 
(816:) the hardness of their skin and because rather than having hair, they 
are feathered; accordingly they do not have the sort of matter from which 
ears may be formed. Likewise too with the four-footed animals that lay eggs 
and have hard scales - the same account also applies to these. (657a17-24) 
While he does not explicitly say that birds lack ears from necessity, he 
gives the sort of explanation that elsewhere is identified as a from-necessity 
explanation: he explains why birds don't have something because it is 
impossible for them to have it, given some feature of them, in this case the 
hardness of their skin and their having feathers. But here, unlike elsewhere, 
Aristotle mentions matter. He says that accordingly (ouv) they do not have 
the matter from which ears are formed. His point is that ears are formed 
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from a certain sort of part, a certain type of skin, which birds lack. This skin 
is the matter for ears. When explaining why it is necessary that something 
lacks something else, you do not need both matter and an efficient cause. 
The absence of either matter or an efficient cause explains why the result 
cannot occur, since both are needed for the result to happen. This is the 
only way in which matter (on its own) can provide a necessity: a lack of 
matter can necessitate the lack of something. 
This is related to a type of hypothetical necessity. Iron is hypothetically 
necessary for the saw and so, lacking iron, the saw cannot come to be. 
Similarly, soft, featherless skin is hypothetically necessary for ears and, 
lacking such skin, ears cannot come to be. In fact, such explanations are 
fairly common in the Parts of Animals. The cause of an animal lacking 
some feature is that it does not meet some necessary prerequisite for having 
the feature. 
There are a number of cases of necessity in the Parts of Animals that 
cannot be explained in terms of matter and an efficient cause. We need 
to examine examples of these before we can pull together Aristotle's views 
about from-necessity as a cause. Consider this explanation of why birds are 
two-footed: 
They are two-footed of necessity; for the being (ovofo) of the bird is that of 
the blooded animals, but at the same time that of the winged animals, and 
blooded animals do not move by more than four points. Accordingly, the 
attached parts are four - as in the other locomotive land-dwellers, so too 
in the birds. But four arms and legs are present in the one group, while in 
the birds, instead of forelimbs and arms, wings are a common feature; and 
in virtue of these they are able to stretch out, and the ability to fly is in the 
being (ev Tfi ovcrii;x) of the bird. So it remains for them to be, of necessity, 
two-footed; for in this way they will move, with their wings, by means of 
four points. (693b5-15)23 
Birds have four limbs because they are blooded animals. But two of these 
need to be wings, because they are flyers. Thus, of necessity, they are two-
footed. Notice that they are not two-footed for the sake of something. They 
have wings for the sake of something, but they are two-footed because of 
a combination of various features of their ousia. At the same time, these 
are direct features of their ousia that do not directly involve matter or an 
efficient cause. 
Aristotle does not differentiate this sort of explanation from the earlier 
ones involving blood, heat, and skin: all are categorized as from necessity 
23 See also PA N.9: a single row of suckers is of necessity given the ousia of a certain kind of octopus. 
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and are not further categorized or subdivided. Consider another case from 
PA n.r; this one comes shortly after the passage where he says that matter 
is temporally prior and for the sake of something. This example is unlike 
all of the others we have seen: 
As being for the sake of something, then - on account of this cause -
these parts are related in the way stated [uniform parts constitute the non-
uniform parts]; but when one also seeks how it is necessary that they be thus, 
it is apparent that they were antecedently so related to one another from 
necessity. For the non-uniform parts are capable of having been composed 
from the uniform parts, both from many of them and from one, as with 
some of the viscera; they are complex in configuration, though generally 
speaking they are composed of one uniform body. But it is impossible that 
the uniform bodies be composed from the non-uniform, for the uniform 
parts would consist of many non-uniform parts. These, then, are the causes' 
owing to which some parts of animals are simple and uniform while others 
are composite and non-uniform. (646b27-647a2) 
After arguing that the uniform parts are for the sake of the non-uniform, 
Aristotle provides this second argument, giving another cause of the one 
constituting the other. He offers what we might think of as a conceptual 
truth: non-uniform parts can consist of uniform parts but uniform parts 
cannot consist of non-uniform parts. You can compose a complex thing out 
of simple things, but you cannot compose a simple thing out of complex 
things. This explanation does not turn on matter, efficient cause, or the 
ousia -except, perhaps, ousia at a very high level of generality; it simply has 
to do with the very notion of a uniform and a non-uniform part. 
From these cases, we can conclude that Aristotle does not think there 
is a single sort of necessity involved in all of these different types of 
"from-necessity" explanations: it is any necessity that is the result of things 
"possessed and produced naturally," as he says in the PA I.I passage. He 
understands "possessed and naturally produced" quite broadly. Aristotle is 
content to bring things to necessity and then consider his job done. Why 
does he not think that to provide a full explanation, he needs to categorize 
the type of necessity at issue, or to bring things back to the four causes? 
Here is one explanation we might be tempted to give: perhaps teleolog-
ical explanations are important because they are not necessary. Thus, the 
epiglottis exists for the sake of not choking, but it is not necessary in order to 
not choke (664b20-665a8). There is another way to avoid choking: some 
animals' windpipes collapse. If teleological explanation were, in general, 
not necessary, this would be a good reason for Aristotle to treat these as 
the two types of explanations. The main problem with this idea is that 
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some cases of for-the-sake-of causes - the ones that Mariska Leunissen calls 
primary teleology - are cases where something is both necessary and for 
the sake of something: it is necessary because it is part of the essence or 
vitality of the organism.24 Birds have wings for the sake of flying and it is 
necessary for birds to have wings, given that they are essentially flyers. 25 
Moreover, as we have seen, in some cases - such as the fat around the 
kidney - something is both for the sake of something and, for a different 
reason, necessary. 
Here is another explanation that might be tempting: perhaps Aristotle 
is primarily interested in what each of the parts is and to discover that we 
need to know what each is for. Our central task is to determine what it 
is, and everything else is secondary and so is shelved under the category 
"necessary." The problem with this explanation is that some necessary 
features result from what a thing is. If we want to know what birds are, we 
need to understand that "of necessity" they are two-footed, even though 
this is not for anything. 
Given the problems with those explanations, the most likely account 
is the following: Aristotle's goal is to bring out the importance of teleo-
logical explanations. He wants to show that, in addition to those other 
explanations people give, in terms of necessity, you must also give teleo-
logical explanations (this is a theme throughout PA I.I). Aristotle accepts 
his predecessors' reliance on necessity as a cause (as he understands his 
predecessors) and sees himself as adding to their type of account. 
The Parts of Animals might also be, in one respect, closer to a more 
Platonic way of thinking about the natural world. It is striking that Aristo-
tle's two causes seem closely related to the explanatory structure of Plato's 
Timaeus, where the Demiurge does everything for the sake of what is 
best (29e-3oa) and necessity is introduced as an additional part of the 
explanatory framework and called the wandering cause (47e-48b). There 
are a number of very important differences between Aristotle's explanatory 
project and Plato's. But perhaps Aristotle's two causes are more close to the 
Timaeus than Aristotle's account in other works. I have argued elsewhere 
that Aristotle sees his four causes as anti-Platonic. 26 Perhaps Parts of Ani-
mals II-IV was composed before he took on this more anti-Platonic account 
of causation. It is easy to imagine that it was composed while in Assos or 
Lesbos - although that is pure speculation. The other possibility is that he 
24 Leunissen 2010 passim, first explained at p. 4 and pp. 18-19. 
25 To be clear, in such cases necessity is not listed as a cause; the point is just that being for the sake 
of something is not an alternative to being necessary. 
26 Ebrey 2014. 
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thinks, for some reason, that in the Parts of Animals we only need these 
two causes, despite the fact that in the Phys. II. 7 he insists that the natural 
scientist identify all four causes for each thing investigated (198a21-24). 
Conclusion 
I have argued that the role of matter in the Parts of Animals is quite different 
from that of necessity. When Aristotle mentions matter in Parts of Animals 
n-rv, he reserves the term for what things properly come to be from. 
This is generally identified as blood, the thing that the body concocts as 
the refined nutriment, able to become any of the parts or to fuel their 
growth and nourishment. By contrast, Aristotle frequently identifies "of 
necessity" as a cause. In many cases this involves what we might identify 
as the matter and efficient cause working together, although Aristotle 
never identifies them this way in the Parts of Animals. Other examples of 
"of-necessity" causes involve facts about the essence of the creature or some 
sort of conceptual necessity. Aristotle is not interested in separating out the 
different types of necessity at work in these examples. Instead, he draws 
everything back to the necessary and that for the sake of which. Matter 
and necessity have very different roles in the Parts of Animals. 
PART II 
Teleology 
